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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF 1HE
STATE OF UTAH
WENDELL E. BENNETT
'
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
DAVIS COUNTY, a municipal
subdivision of the State of Utah
'
Defendant and Respondent.

Case No.
12311

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action to recover reasonable compensation and expenses for appointed counsel for the defense of three separate indigent persons determined
by the court to be unable to employ counsel who were
charged with felonies in Davis County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was heard by the Honorable Calvin
Gould, sitting without a jury, and resulted in a judgment holding, among other things, that Davis County
was not arbitrary or capricious in adopting standards for the Davis County Criminal Defense Program patterned after the Federal Criminal Justice
Act of 1964 and therefore held that the payment of
'
1

$15.00 per hour for in court work and $10.00 per
hour for out of court work was not unreasonable
compensation under the provisions of Title 77-64-6 ,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff and appellant seeks reversal of the
court's judgment entered in the above-entitled case
limiting compensation paid to attorneys defending
indigent persons charged with a crime at a fixed rate,
not even covering overhead expenses, and a holding
by this Honorable Court that the reasonableness of
compensation paid attorneys in such cases must be
determined by competent testimony concerning the
reasonableness offees chargeS, and in this case $25.00
per hour.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant, an attorney admitted to the practice of law in the State of Utah, was appointed on
three separate occasions by the Honorable Thornley
K. Swan, one of the judges in the District Court for
the Second Judicial District of the State of Utah, pursuant to Title 77-64-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as amended, to defend three separate indigent persons charged with the commission of a crime in Davis
County, (R. 37-38).
In the first case, namely, the Darryl Collins case,
the appellant expended 19 hours of time and $13.40
expenses. In the second of the three cases, namely, the
Alan Baxter case, appellant expended 37.5 hours of
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time and $46.20 in expenses. In the third of the three
cases, namely, the Creig LeRoy Jacobs case, the appellant expended 17.6 hours of time, and $10.80 expenses in fulfilling the court's assignment, (R. 42,
Ex. "A", '''B," "C").
Timely claims were submitted to the Davis
County Commission for the payment of the claims
on the Collins, Baxter, and Jacobs case, making claim
for compensation at the rate of $25.00 per hour for
all time expended on said cases, and for full reimbursement of costs, (R. 37, 38, 42, Ex. "A," "B,"
"C").
The Davis County Commission rejected the
claims submitted by appellant, and declined to pay
same, (R. 42, Ex. ''''D"), (R. 37, 38).
At trial the only evidence, which was put in the
form of a proff er of evidence, and accepted by the respondent, was that the appellant had performed the
work outlined above, and had submitted a claim for
$25.00 per hour, which was the minimum charge per
hour recommended by the Utah State Bar Association
based upon a study made by them, and that the usual
hourly rate charged by apellant for handling legal
matters was $35.00 per hour. Inasmuch as the appellant had been apointed by the court to defend the indigent criminals, he testified that he would be willing to accept only $25.00 per hour for the time actually
spent in the defense of said indigent persons which
amount was reasonable, and was an amount custom3

arily charged by others in the legal profession in the
area.
One of the factors considered by the appellant
in setting his minimum fee per hour at $25.00 was
the fact that the appellant's minimum overhead expense amounted to $12.50 per hour, (T. 7-8).
The Davis County Commission, in attempting to
fulfill the mandate of the Utah State Legislature as
set out in Title 77-64-6, Utah Code Annotated 1953
'
'
as amended, merely adopted the provisions of the
Federal Criminal Justice Act of 1964 (Public Law
88-455, approved Aug. 20, 1964, 18 U.S.C. 3006
(A) ) , and determined that attorneys should be paid
$15.00 per hour for time expended in court and
$10.00 per hour for time expended out of court, (T.
14). They did not take into consideration the overhead costs of an attorney in setting the compensation
rates, and at the time they set the rate of compensation they didn't know what it cost to run a law office,
(T. 22).
There is some question as to whether the commission ever sought the advice of Judge Swan, or the
county attorney as to the reasonableness of fees in
that Commissioner Smoot at one place in his testimony denied that Judge Swan or the County Attorney had ever been consulted, (T. 33-34); however,
.on cross-examination he reversed himself and claimed that they consulted Judge Swan and the County
Attorney regai·ding the reasonableness of fees, (T.
38).
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.
Peterson, the Davis Oounty Attorney, who
testified that he had something to do with drafting
the Davis County Criminal Defense Program limiting the payment of attorney's fees to $10.00 per hour
for out of court work and $15.00 per hour for in court
work, also testified that he hadn't made a personal
study of the costs of legal counsel in the Ogden-Davis
County and Salt Lake area, (T. 54), but did know
that he did not charge less than $25.00 per hour for
his own legal services.
Commissioner Flint testified that he made no
independent investigation to determine the costs of
an attorney maintaining his office in the Davis County, Ogden and Salt Lake area prior to passing the
Davis County Criminal Defense Program, and he
wasn't aware of any of the other members of the
Davis County Commission who had made such a
study. He also admitted that none of the members of
the Commission made an independent investigation
as to what the fees nonnally charged by attorneys in
the area were at that time other than talking with
the Davis County Attorney, (T. 59-60). Commissioner Flint did, however, know at the time the Davis
County Criminal Defense Program was passed that
attorneys in the Davis County area were charging
$25.00 per hour for their legal services. However,
because the legal profession had gratuitously rendered the service before, he didn't feel that they should
be paid at the usual normal and reasonable rate of
compensation, namely, $25.00 per hour, (T. 60).
5

Commissioner Flint admitted that to the best of
his knowledge there was no other class of people, other than attorneys, that the county requested furnish
their services for something less than they normally
charged, ( T. 60-61) .
The cost of the Criminal Defense Program in
Davis County has been such that it has not been necessary to increase the mill levy, as authorized by Title
77-64-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,
and as a matter of fact there have been sufficient
funds available for the County Commission to vote
themselves a substantial increase in salary along
with other elected officials without increasing the
mill levy, (T. 61).
The respondent claims that the Davis County
Criminal Defense Program was presented to the Davis County Bar Association for approval and adop·
tion. However, the uncontroverted testimony, in the
form of an accepted proffer of proof, was that the
apellant attended said meeting, along with Brent
Wilcox, also a Salt Lake attorney, attempted to re·
gister objection to the proposed defense program,
but were denied the right to vote either in support of
or in opposition to the program inasmuch as the appellant and Mr. Wilcox were members of the Salt
Lake County Bar Association and not the Davis
County Bar Association even though they received
appointments to defend indigent persons charged with
crimes in Davis County because of the fact they resided in the South Davis County area.
6

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DAVIS COUNTY CRIMINAL DEFENSE
PROGRAM IS VOID BECAUSE IT REQUIRES
THE TRIAL COURT, IN THE ABSENCE OF A
FILING OF A COMPLAINT AND A TRIAL
THEREON, TO EXPRESS AN OPINION AS TO
THE AMOUNT OF MONEY WHICH SHOULD
BE PAID ON A GIVEN CLAIM.

The Davis County Criminal Defense Program,
(R. 42, Defendant's Ex. 2), and the resolution implementing same, (R. 42, Defendant's Ex. 1), and
the manner in which it was implemented, (R, 42,
Plaintiff's Ex. "D"), violates the provisions of the
Code of Criminal Pr'OCedure dealing with counsel for
indigent defendants, Title 77-64-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, through Section 7 of said
Title and Chapter.
A review of the Davis County Commission's
resolution ( R. 42, Plaintiff's Ex. 1) and the Davis
County Criminal Defense Program implemented by
said resolution, (R. 42, plaintiff's Ex. 2), on its face
shows that the statutory duties imposed upon the
court and statutory duties imposed upon the county
are so intermingled as to violate the provisions of the
Code of Criminal Procedure dealing with counsel for
indigent defendants. Section 4 of the resolution
states:
''The said Second Judicial District Judge
or First District Juvenile Judge shall retain
7

ju1·isdiction of the case thoughout on all matters relatii:g .to the functioning of the Davis
County Cr1mmal Defense Program including
such matters as determination of indigency of
the accused, appointment and release of counsel, approval of counsel's expense vouchers
ancl determination of need for and
of e:t:penses for expert investigative or other
services." (Italics added)
The Davis County Criminal Defense Program
implemented by said resolution (R. 42, Defendant's
Ex. 2), under the heading of "Duties of Appointed
Attorneys," under VI, on page ten of said plan also
requil'es that the district judge approve payment of
fees and expenses by appointed counsel where it states
in paragraph 2 as follows:
"An appointed attorney claiming fees
under this plan shall keep a record of the
hours spent in court and out of court in working on his appointed case. Upon the completion
of his services in the district court, including
notice of appeal, if any, appointed counsel shall
prornutly execute all forms required by the
court-or the Board of Davis County Commissioners and file promptly any claim for compensation or reimbursement as directed by the
court. Disbursement shall be made by the Office of the Treasurer, Davis County, State of
Utah.''
The plan as implemented also provides for the
approval of costs and expenses by the district judge,
(R. 42, Plaintiff's Exs. '''A," "B," "C").
The Davis C'Ounty Commission, in a letter to the
8

appellant dated February 7, 1969, expressly set out
the requirements contained in the resolution and the
Criminal Defense Program Plan, (R. 42 Plaintiff's
Ex. "D"). In that letter the Davis County Commissioners stated as follows:
"In checking your claim, we note that
:your rate of pay is _in
of that specified
m the
Will you kmdly send us a corrected claim and we shall be happy to present
it to Judge Thornley K. Swan for approval and
send it through the proper channels for payment."
Not only did the Davis County Commission,
through their Criminal Defense Program attempt to
require the district judge, in the absence of a filing
of a complaint and a trial thereon, to express an opinion as to the amount of money which should be paid
to appointed counsel, but they attempted to control
who should and should not be appointed as counsel
to defend indigent defendants. The Davis County
Commission, on or about December 30, 1969, forwarded a letter to Judge Thornley K. Swan in which
they attempted to control who should and who should
not be appointed to defend indigent defendants, (R.
42, Plaintiff's Ex. "E"). In that letter they state:
"In view of the pending litigation between
the county and \Vendell Bennett, arising out
persons
of his appointment to
charged with the comn11ss10n of crime, we hereby request that Mr. Bennett not be appointed
on future such matters, and that he be removed from any present appointments.
9

'''We have an indication that he is presently defending by appointment one Alan
B:;ixter, and one Creig LeRoy Jacobs. We herewith request that you make new apointments
in.
two matters, and any other matters
w1thm your knowledge where Mr. Bennett is
acting under your order, until such time as the
lawsuit between him and the county can be
resolved."
A review of the above shows that the Davis
County Criminal Defense Program, and the resolution implementing same, and the manner in which
the program has been implemented, is in derogation
of the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure dealing with
counsel for indigent defendants in that under the
plan the county commission has attempted to exercise duties assigned to the judiciary, and has required, by resolution, the judiciary to perform functions
properly belonging to the commission.
Title 77-64-6, Utah Oode Annotated, 1953, as
amended, requires the county commissioners to authorize the court to provide counsel for indigent defendants; however, the statues require that they, and
not the court, award counsel so appointed reasonable
compensation and expenses for the services rendered.
Our court addressed itself to the question of
whether the district court should or could not be
a party to approving the payment of attorney's fees
in the case of Washington County vs. Day, 22 Utah
2d 6, 447 P.2d 189. In that decision the Honorable
Court stated:
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"The court cannot enter into a contract
for the county and should not in the absence of
a filing of a complaint and a trial thereon express an opinion as to the amount of money
which should be paid on any given claim."
The Davis County Criminal Defense Program,
and its enabling act, which requires the district judge
to approve the payment of claims for services rendered by attorneys is, therefore, contrary to law, and is
void.
The county commissioners' attempt to control
the appointment of counsel under the Davis County
Criminal Defense Program is also contrary to law,
and is further grounds for avoiding the Davis County Criminal Defense Program, and its enabling act.
Title 77-64-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended, and Title 77-64-6, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended, places the responsibility upon the
judiciary for the appointment of counsel to defend
indigent defendants, and gives no authority to the
county commission to appoint counsel, or participate
in the appointment of counsel. The Davis County
Commission's attempt to do so under their Criminal
Defense Program, as witnessed by Commissioner
Evans' letter of December 30, 1969, ( R. 42, Plaintiff's Ex. "E"), is, therefore, further evidence that
the Criminal Defense Program in Davis County is
void in that it is contrary to state law.
11

POINT II.
DAVIS COUNTY'S ARBITRARY FIXING OF
FEES IS CONTRARY TO THE STATE S'TATUTE, AND THE AWARD OF REASONABLE
COMPENSATION AND EXPENSES FOR ATTORNEYS ASSIGNED TO DEFEND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS CANNOT BE LIMITED
BY AN ARBITRARY PRE-DETERMINED FEE
SCHEDULE WHICH IS ADMITTEDLY LOWER
THAN M I N I M U M FEES FOR SERVICES
CHARGED BY ATTORNEYS FOR SIMILAR
WORK.

As set out under the Statement of Facts, the Davis County Criminal Defense Program's rates of
compensation were set by the county commission because they conformed to the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. 3006 A(d).
The county commission did not make a study of
their own to determine law office overhead costs, or
what the minimum fee for legal services rendered
was in the Davis County, Ogden and Salt Lake City
area. Commissioner Flint did, however, admit that
he was aware, at the time the Davis County Criminal
Defense Program was adopted that attorneys in the
area were charging $25.00 per hour for their services. The Davis County Attorney also admitted that
he, in his private capacity as an attorney, was charging a minimum of $25.00 per hour for legal services
rendered. Commissioner Smoot was aware that fees
being charged for attorneys at the time the Davis
County Criminal Defense Program was passed were
at least $25.00 per hour, and as a matter of fact he
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testified that he was paying his own attorney much
more than that for legal services rendered, (T. 29).
The Federal Criminal Justice Act relied on by
the county, 18 U.S.C. 3006 A ( d) in no way purports
to afford legal counsel reasonable compensation for
their services rendered, and in that regard is very
dissimilar to the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure
dealing with counsel for indigent defendants. Title
77-64-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, is
the Legislature's mandate that counties within the
State of Utah arrange to provide legal counsel for
indigent defendants through a public defender program, or in the alternative authorize the court to provide legal services for the indigent defendants, and
then requires that the counties award the attorneys
so appointed reasonable compensation and expenses.
There is little doubt but that the Legislature
could have prescribed the payment of fees to appointed counsel on other than a reasonable compensation
basis, as did the Congress of the United States, in the
Criminal Justice Act; however, that is not the case.
Our Legislature, rather than picking an arbitrary
figure at which counsel would be compensated, specifically required that the counties award appointed
counsel reasonable compensation and expenses.
To say that an arbitrary figure, which doesn't
even meet overhead costs of operating a law office
for out of court work performed, and which was set
without a study of the costs of operating a law office,
13

and a study of what fees were reasonably charged by
attorneys performing legal services is a rather naive
approach to some long overdue relief afforded by the
Legislature of the State of Utah.
By applying the Davis County Criminal Defense
Program's rate of compensation to the three cases
handled by the appellant in Davis County, a quick calculation will show that for just over 55 hours of time
spent by the appellant in defending indigent defendants his overhead costs were $2.50 more per hour
than his compensation, and that for just under 19
hours of time spent in defending said indigent defendants his compensation was $2.50 more per hour
than his actual costs. By a simple mathematical computation it can be determined that appellant's loss in
defending the three indigent defendants on overhead
costs alone amounted to $91.00.
It is appellant's contention that a loss of $91.00
does not constitute reasonable compensation as that
phrase is used in Title 77-64-6, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended.

As an interesting aside, it should be noted that
the Federal Criminal Justice Act, which does not purport to pay attorneys reasonable compensation, (U.S.
vs. Rountree, D.C.N.Y. 1966, 254 F. Supp. 1009) was
recently amended to expand the right of counsel and
increase the hourly fee of assigned counsel to $30.00
per hour for court time and $20.00 per hour for out
of court time, S. 1461.
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This Honorable Court, in the case of Washington County vs. Day, 22 Utah 2d 6. 447 P.2d 189 interpreted Title 77-64-6, Utah Code Annotated 1g53
' be'
as the Legislature's mandate that attorneys
awarded reasonable compensation and expenses rendered to the indigent defendant.
The court, in the Washington County case, stated, at page 191 of the Pacific Reporter:
"We do not believe the Legislature was
simply declaring the law when it enacted
Chapter 171 above. We think a wise legislature
intended to and did remove the burden of affording counsel for impecunious defendants in
criminal cases from the tired shoulders of the
legal profession and placed it upon society,
where it has always rightfully belonged.
"By declaring certain minimum standards to be provided by each county in this
state, the legislature could not have intended
that any one or more of those counties could
set at naught the statute and declare itself beyond the above law."
It is the appellant's contention that Davis County has attempted through the enactment of the Davis
County Criminal Defense Program, and its enabling
resolution to place themself above the law and escape
the responsibility of awarding appointed counsel reasonable compensation and expenses for defending indigent defendants.
There is no other class of persons, other than attorneys, who perform services for Davis County that
15

are compensated for their services at a rate lower
than their usual and customary rate of compensatioo.
The evidence at the trial of the matter, submitted on a proff er of proof, and accepted by Davis
County was that the reasonable compensation for the
services rendered to the three indigent defendants
defended by the appellant v.'as a minimum of $25.00
per hour, which was $10.00 per hour less than the appellant customarily charges for legal services, and
could have obtained for other legal services rendered
during the time he was performing his court appointed duty to defend the three indigent defendants, the
claims for which defense are the subject matter of
this lawsuit.
There was no evidence presented at trial rebutting the fact that $25.00 per hour was reasonable
compensation for the appellant for the services rendered, and the county's evidence was that the reason
it was not being paid was because they had adopted
a Criminal Defense Program setting a lower rate of
compensation that would be paid by the county, which
plan \vas adopted without a study on the part of the
Commission to determine overhead costs of operating a law office, or what the reasonable fees for services rendered by attorneys in the area were at the
time even
the County Commissioners knew
of their own know ledge, in dealing with their own
atto1·neys, that $25.00 pe1· hom· was a minimum rate
being charged at the time.
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It is not the appellant's desire in bringing this
appeal to express dissatisfaction with the criminal
justice system, and the requirement that counsel be
appointed to defend indigent defendants. Appellant
recognizes that representation of all defendants
charged with serious crimes is essential to the proper
administration of justice. However, appellant believes, and thus prosecutes this appeal, that the legal
profession alone should not be required to bear the
total responsibiilty of the proper administration of
law but that that responsibility should be borne by
society as a whole.
CONCLUSION

The trial court's judgment holding that the arbitrary payment of $10.00 per hour for out of court
time and $15.00 per hour for in court time is reasonable, should be vacated, and appellant should be
awarded compensation for the defense of the three
indigent defendants at the rate of $25.00 per hour as
the testimony at trial was that $25.00 per hour was
minimum reasonable compensation for the services
rendered.
Respectfully submitted,
WENDELL E. BENNETT
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant

604 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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